We estimate the demand for alcohol from pooled data across U.S. states and the years 1982-97. A number of problems with the available price data suggest that they may contain substantial measurement error, which biases the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. In addition OLS regressions may be biased because price is endogenous. To address these problems, we use state and Federal alcohol taxes as instrumental variables for prices. Formal tests strongly confirm the hypothesis of measurement error and/or endogeneity. Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the price elasticity of demand are substantially larger in absolute value than ordinary least squares estimates. IV estimates range from -.53 to -1.24. The 1991 increase in Federal excise taxes on alcohol reduced consumption between 2.5 and 6 percent.
I. Introduction
Alcohol consumption is an important public policy issue because of its associations with drunken driving, violence and diseases such as cirrhosis of the liver. Alcohol taxes raise beverage prices and thus discourage consumption. How much consumption declines depends on the extent to which taxes are passed on to prices, and the extent to which consumers respond by decreasing consumption.
In an earlier paper, we examined the relationship between alcohol taxes and beverage prices (Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2001 ). The central purpose of this paper is to provide estimates of the price elasticity of demand for alcohol, and thus to calculate the effects of changes in alcohol taxes on alcohol consumption. We employ pooled data across U.S. states over the years 1982-97.
A key difficulty in obtaining reliable estimates of the price elasticity of demand is the quality of the available price data, which may contain substantial measurement error. 1 The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) reports retail prices for beer, wine and spirits as part of their cost of living surveys. However, the beverage definitions have changed over time, requiring adjustments to create a consistent time series. The data may not be consistent across states and over time because members of local chambers of commerce are responsible for collection and reporting.
Beer and wine price data are only available since 1982, and there are significant gaps in the data for 2 Despite their problems, the ACCRA data have been widely used in studies of alcohol consumption by Nelson (2000) , (Grossman et al., 1998) , Beard et al. (1997) , Manning et al. (1995) , Kenkel (1993) and Gruenewald et al.(1993) , an analysis of traffic accidents, homicides, suicides and other deaths by Sloan et al. (1994b) , and in a study on alcoholrelated fatalities by Young and Likens (2000) , among others. 3 This point has been made by Manning et al. (1995) , p. 126, and others. 4 A similar but less severe situation occurs with wine: Five states "control" wine sales, while the remainder levy per unit excise taxes.
various states and years. 2 In addition, beverage prices may be endogenous in the sense that higher demand may result in higher market prices.
3
Measurement error in the price data implies that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is biased and inconsistent. Similarly, endogeneity of prices also renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. In simple models, both problems bias the estimated price elasticity away from negative values. That is, OLS may substantially underestimate how much consumers decrease consumption in response to an increase in price.
An alternative to the ACCRA data is to use excise taxes as measures of the price of alcohol.
However, taxes do not accurately measure prices either: As will be seen below, combined state and Federal excise taxes typically amount to only about 10 percent of retail beverage prices. Indeed, taxes themselves are difficult to measure accurately. In eighteen "control" states liquor is sold through state stores and is subject to ad valorem markups and/or excise taxes. In these states, the markup is in part a tax, because the government receives the revenue from the markup, but it is difficult to determine the implicit tax rate from the normal costs of wholesaling and retailing liquor. The remaining "license" states levy a per unit excise tax. 4 Tax rates also vary according to alcohol content, place or volume of production, size of container, place purchased (on-or off-premise), and there may be case or bottle handling fees.
These problems with price data in general and spirits and wine taxes in particular have led some researchers to conclude that beer taxes are the best available indicator of the cost of alcohol.
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However, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2001) show that beer taxes alone are not highly correlated with either the ACCRA price data or national trends in the detailed CPI for alcohol. But a broader set of tax variables, including not just beer taxes but also liquor and wine per unit excise taxes, percentage excise taxes, and state markups, provides a set of instrumental variables which in principle can resolve the problems with the price data. That is, a set of alcohol tax variables appears to satisfy the conditions for use as instruments: They are, as a group, significantly correlated with true alcohol prices, and uncorrelated with the measurement error. 6 Thus, we first test for endogeneity and/or measurement error using a Hausman test. The null hypothesis of exogeneity is strongly rejected, and we proceed to estimate alcohol demand using instrumental variable methods.
An additional question when estimating the demand for alcohol from pooled data is whether to include state-specific dummy variables. Including state dummies will at least partially control for unobserved differences across states which may bias estimates of price effects. For example, attitudes toward alcohol consumption differ markedly among religious and other groups, and these attitudes are likely to influence alcohol policy. Thus, states in which alcohol is viewed less favorably -and people are less inclined to drink anyway -may levy higher alcohol taxes and adopt other policies which increase and year dummies are included.
the cost of alcohol, enact and enforce more restrictive legislation concerning drunk driving, have more extensive programs of alcohol education, etc. The data will then display a negative correlation between alcohol prices and consumption. But this correlation overstates the impact of prices themselves, unless there are variables included to control for "tastes" of the residents and for all of the policies that discourage alcohol consumption. Realistically, it is not feasible to have sufficient data to control for "all" the influences on alcohol consumption, and thus even instrumental variable estimators are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. State-specific dummy variables provide effective controls for unobserved factors such as tastes or policies which differ across states but are constant over time, and thus reduce the problem of omitted variable bias. However, including state-specific dummy variables also has a substantial cost: The crosssectional variation in the data are effectively removed, and estimates are based only on the variation over time within states. In the data used here, 90 percent of the variation in alcohol consumption is explained by state-specific effects, and only 10 percent of the variation occurs over time. 8 Thus, including state dummies substantially reduces the information on which estimates of the price elasticity and other parameters are based. This paper provides estimates both with and without state-specific dummies, and assesses the quality of each.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. The theoretical framework and data are discussed in Sections II and III. Parameter estimates and their implications for tax effects are presented in Section IV. Conclusions are in the last section.
II. Theoretical and Econometric Framework
We assume that the consumer's utility function is weakly separable with respect to alcohol and other goods and services. The assumption of weak separability ensures that a price index for alcohol can be constructed from information on the prices of beer, wine and spirits, without having to consider the prices of other goods. 9 Thus, the consumers' decision process is assumed to be done in two stages.
In the first stage, consumers determine their total expenditure on alcoholic beverages. In the second stage, they divide this expenditure into specific beverages: beer, wine, and spirits. This paper is concerned with only the first stage -the determination of total alcohol expenditure and consumption.
The first stage of the consumers' decision process is represented by a composite demand equation for total alcohol as a function of price, income and other variables, Z.
(1)
where M = p b q b + p w q w + p s q s is total expenditure on beer, wine and spirits. The price of alcohol, P, is the Stone price index, a geometric weighted average of the prices of beer, wine and spirits, with weights equal to each beverage's share in total expenditure on alcohol. 
The dependent variable, M/P, is a composite index of real alcohol consumption. An alternative would be to compute a direct measure of total alcohol consumption from the quantities of beer, spirits and wine, weighting each by their respective alcohol content. In practice, the two measures are almost identical: The correlation between the composite index and the direct measure of alcohol consumption is .999.
We interpret equation (1) as a demand function for alcohol. One econometric problem associated with estimation of (1) is that price may be endogenous or measured with error. If beverage prices are measured with error, then the price index will be correlated with the disturbance term and the ordinary least squares estimator of the price coefficient is biased and inconsistent. 10 If there is only a single variable subject to classical measurement error, then the OLS estimator is biased toward zero (attenuated). Similarly, if price is endogenous, it is correlated with the disturbance term, and OLS estimates a weighted average of the demand (negative) and supply (positive) coefficients. Thus, endogeneity of prices will also bias the OLS estimator away from negative values.
The biases due to measurement error and endogeneity in the price data can be eliminated by standard two-stage estimation methods, if a set of proper instrumental variables can be found. There are two key properties of instrumental variables: They must be correlated with the true prices, and uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the consumption equation. In asymptotic theory, any non-zero correlation with prices is "enough." However, in practical applications on finite samples, the correlation must be substantial. Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2001) show that state and Federal excise taxes and markups explain about thirty percent of the variation in alcohol prices in pooled cross section time series data similar to that employed in this study. Assuming that at least some -and perhaps a substantial amount -of the variation in prices is due to measurement error, these results suggest that the tax variables satisfy the first condition to be proper instruments.
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The second condition -uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the consumption equation -is likely to be satisfied in the case of measurement error, but may not be for endogeneity. That is, there is no a priori reason to expect that measurement errors in prices are correlated with alcohol taxes. But as discussed above, it is possible that state policies reflect (unmeasured) attitudes toward alcohol. In particular, taxes may be higher in states in which there is stronger anti-alcohol sentiment. If this is the case, taxes are not proper instrumental variables.
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We conclude that state and Federal excise taxes and markups are likely to be good instrumental variables to deal with the measurement error problem, but may not be fully satisfactory to deal with endogeneity. However, the latter problem is mitigated to the extent that the regressions include socio-economic variables and/or state dummies which control for sentiment toward alcohol.
Hausman (1978) established a general test for correlation between a right hand side variable and the disturbance term. We employ a version due to MacKinnon (1989, 1993) : The (logarithm of) price is first regressed on all the other right hand side variables in equation (1) and a set of instrumental variables. Composite demand is then estimated with the residual from the price regression as an additional regressor. If the estimated coefficient of the residual is significantly different from zero, then the null hypothesis of exogenous prices is rejected.
III. Data
The econometric analysis uses annual data for 49 states (excluding Hawaii, because price data are not available) and the District of Columbia over the time period 1982 -1997. Data for consumption of beer, wine, and spirits are from the Brewers Almanac. They are computed as shipments of beer, wine, and spirits divided by the total population. Quantities of beer, wine and spirits are multiplied by their average alcohol content (respectively, 4.5%, 11%, and 40%) and expressed as gallons of pure ethanol per capita. As Table 1 indicates, beer accounts for 55% of total alcohol consumption, wine 11%, and spirits 34%. The dependent variable in the consumption regressions is (the logarithm of) total alcohol consumption, denoted "acon" in Table 1 . Alcohol consumption averages a bit less than two gallons per capita per year, with a considerable range from less than one gallon per capita per year in Utah to more than four gallons in Washington DC.
Beverage prices are from the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA), which gathers price data for its quarterly survey of the cost of living in various cities around the U.S. The surveys report retail prices, exclusive of sales taxes, for specific beverages. 13 Annual, state level data are calculated by averaging the quarterly figures from one or more cities within each state.
14 15 We use the ACCRA COLI excluding housing. In earlier work we found that the ACCRA COLI including housing is sensitive to exactly which cities are included in any particular sample. Excluding housing the series is much more consistent over time.
16 J&B Scotch is a fairly high quality spirits beverage, while Gallo Sauvignon Blanc is not of the same standing among wines. CPI data -based on "all malt beverages" for beer, vodka for spirits, and " "Control" states levy percentage markups and/or excise taxes based on value instead of -or in addition to -per unit excise taxes. Data on these taxes are included as well for the states and years in which they occur.
Income is measured as per capita personal income, deflated by the state COLI and the national CPI. Two age variables, the percentages of population aged 18-29 and over 65, control for the life cycle pattern of alcohol consumption. 18 The legal drinking age for beer increased from 18 in some states to 21 in all states during the sample period, and previous research concluded that youth drinking declined (Coate and Grossman, 1988) . Whether there is a measurable impact on total consumption remains to be seen. Alcohol sentiment or "taste" is represented by religious variables and the 
IV. Findings
Estimates of equation (1), the composite demand for alcohol, are presented in Table 2 . The first column presents ordinary least squares estimates, with state dummy variables excluded. The estimated price elasticity of demand is -.345 and significantly different from zero. However, measurement error and/or endogeneity, if present, are likely to bias the estimated coefficient toward zero. As indicated in the first row of Table 3 , a Hausman test strongly rejects exogeneity in favor of endogeneity and/or explanation is that increases in income may primarily affect the quality of the beverages consumed, rather than the alcohol content. 20 The two "states" with the highest alcohol consumption are Washington DC and Nevada, both of which have large tourism industries. measurement error.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents two stage least squares estimates of the composite demand, using the tax variables as instruments for the price variable. As expected, the estimated price elasticity of demand is larger than in column 1: A one percent increase in alcohol prices is estimated to reduce consumption by 1.24 percent.
Most of the other coefficient estimates also conform to theoretical expectations. The estimated income elasticity is positive, although only about .1. 19 A one percentage point increase in the share of the population aged 18-29 is estimated to increase per capita alcohol consumption by about 3 percent.
A one percentage point increase in the population share over age 65 is estimated to reduce consumption by about one-half of one percent, and increasing the legal drinking age by one year is estimated to reduce consumption by one percent, although neither of these estimates is statistically significant. The population in dry counties and the religion variables are each negatively and significantly related to consumption. The largest effect comes from Mormonism: A one percent increase in the share of the population that is Mormon is estimated to reduce alcohol consumption by one percent. Finally, tourism has a significant and large relationship with consumption -an increase of one percentage point in the hotel and lodging share of Gross State Product is associated with an increase of 4.5 percent in alcohol consumption.
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Column 3 of Table 2 displays OLS estimates of the composite demand for alcohol when statespecific dummy variables are included. As expected, the R-squared increases markedly, reflecting two important features of the data: Most of the variation in consumption is cross-sectional, and much of this variation is not accounted for by price, income and the other control variables. Also as expected, the estimated price elasticity is small in magnitude when the estimation method is OLS. Indeed, it is not statistically different from zero. We again perform the Hausman test for endogeneity/measurement error, this time including the state dummies among the instruments. As indicated in row 2 of Table 3 , the null hypothesis of exogeneity is even more strongly rejected, implying that the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent.
The fourth column of Table 1 presents two stage least squares estimates with the state dummies included. The estimated price elasticity is statistically significant and again much larger in absolute value than using OLS: A one percent increase in the price of alcohol is estimated to reduce consumption by about three-fourths of one percent.
The estimated coefficients of some of the control variables, however, display unexpected signs when state dummies are included. Income and population age 18-25 still have statistically significant and positive effects on consumption, and Other Religion has a significant negative effect. But population over age 65, Catholic, and Southern Baptist now have significant positive associations with alcohol consumption. The legal drinking age and tourism have also changed signs, and Mormonism is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
There is a simple explanation for these sign reversals and general lack of significance: With state-specific dummy variables included, parameter estimates are based solely on the variation within $8.40 from 1951-1984, $8.80 in 1985, and $10 from 1986-1990 per 80 proof gallon. The relatively small increase for spirits had the effect of more nearly equalizing the tax per unit of pure ethanol.
states over time -the variation across states is entirely absorbed in the coefficients of the state dummies. 21 Apparently, there is insufficient within state variation in the control variables to provide reliable estimates.
The last two columns of Table 2 therefore display estimates of the composite demand with only price, income, and the state and time dummies included. The adjusted R-squared falls by only .01, confirming that the excluded control variables have little predictive value when state dummies are included. The OLS estimate of the price elasticity is small, positive and insignificant, but a Hausman test again strongly confirms measurement error and/or endogeneity (Table 3) . Using two stage least squares, the estimated price elasticity continues to be statistically significant and has a magnitude of about minus one-half.
In 1991 the federal government raised excise taxes on alcohol. The beer tax was doubled from $9 to $18 per barrel, the spirits tax was increased from $10 to $10.80 per 80 proof gallon, and the wine tax was increased from $0.17 to $1.07 per wine gallon. 22 We now calculate the estimated effect of the tax changes on total alcohol consumption. The calculation involves several steps: Recently, Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2001) investigated the relationship between alcohol taxes and prices and found significant over-shifting of alcohol taxes. Specifically, beer prices rise $1.71 for each dollar increase in the beer tax, spirits prices rise $1.60 for each $1 increase in spirits taxes, and wine prices rise $1.24 for a $1 increase in wine taxes. Converting all values to the 1997 dollars per gallon of pure ethanol used in this study, and evaluating percentage changes at the means of the data, the estimated effect was to increase the price of beer by 7.4%, spirits by 1.6%, and wine by 8.3%. The composite price index for pure ethanol rose by 5.0%. Based on the range of price elasticities of demand presented in this paper, total alcohol consumption is estimated to have declined by between 2.5 and 6 percent.
V. Summary and Conclusions
We have estimated the demand for alcohol using data pooled across U.S. states and over time.
We tested for and confirmed the presence of measurement error and/or endogeneity in the ACCRA price data. Using state and Federal tax rates as instrumental variables, two stage least squares estimates of the demand for alcohol yield significantly larger estimates of the response to price than do ordinary least squares estimates, which are biased toward zero.
Estimates are also sensitive to whether or not state-specific dummy variables are included in the demand equations. Excluding state effects runs the risk of biased estimators stemming from omitted variables that are correlated with both price and consumption. However, when state effects are included, the large cross-sectional variation in alcohol consumption and other variables is effectively removed. The estimated price elasticities are then smaller in absolute value.
Instrumental variable estimates of the price elasticity of demand range from about -.5 to -1.2.
These estimates indicate somewhat more price responsiveness than do previous studies using aggregate data (Leung and Phelps, 1993) . However, the largest response to price is estimated when state dummy variables are excluded, and thus may be biased upward in absolute value.
The main point of this paper is that in any application using the ACCRA data, the problem of measurement error must and apparently can be confronted using state and Federal taxes as instruments.
For example, Manning et al.'s (1995) finding that heavy consumers of alcohol are essentially unresponsive to prices may be in part an artifact of measurement error. However, we are somewhat less confident that taxes are proper instruments to deal with endogeneity, because taxes may be correlated with unmeasured attitudes or other alcohol policies. 
